By: John M. Golden, The University of Texas School of Law (Austin)
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
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By: John M. Golden, The University of Texas School of Law (Austin)
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
Download this Article in PDF format from The Jerome Hall Law Library’s Digital Repository.
By: Kevin E. Collins, Washington University School of Law (St Louis)
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
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By: Peter Lee, University of California, Davis, School of Law
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
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By: Tun-Jen Chiang, George Mason University School of Law
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
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By: Martin J. Adelman, George Washington University
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
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By Ted M. Sichelman, University of San Diego School of Law
from Volume 1, Issue 2 (Spring, 2011)
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Abstract: A recurring issue in intellectual property theory is how the scope of patent rights affects invention and commercialization. Traditionally, there has been a dichotomous debate: one view stemming from Ed Kitch, promoting broad “prospect”-style patents in the hands of a single inventor, and another view from Robert Merges and Richard Nelson, advocating relatively narrow scope to encourage competition in innovation. More recently, a variety of scholars have set forth more nuanced positions. My thesis here is that the variance in these views can be traced to differing empirical attitudes about how well the market functions relative to a patent system in promoting invention, commercialization, and coordination among market actors in the R&D process. By investigating these empirical differences, scholars can more rigorously address a number of important issues not fully examined by the literature, such as the cumulative nature of technology commercialization (not just invention), the tailoring of patent scope by industry, collaborative innovation, and the decoupling of patent rights to separately address invention and commercialization incentives.
By William McGeveran, University of Minnesota Law School – Twin Cities
from Volume 1, Issue 1 (Fall, 2010)
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By Margreth Barrett, University of California Hastings College of Law
from Volume 1, Issue 1 (Fall, 2010)
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Abstract: The Trademark Scholars Roundtable participants discussed a wide range of approaches to understanding and limiting the ever-increasing sprawl of trademark rights. It was a productive and stimulating discussion. In this essay, I would like to combine some of my own ideas with points and suggestions made by the other participants, to sketch out a possible judicial approach to regulating the sprawl. Before discussing a potential solution, however, it is important to understand the nature of the problem, and some of its primary causes.
Section I will discuss the problem and set the stage for my proposal. Section II will then suggest that courts relegate certain particularly problematic new forms of trademark infringement claims to a “passing off/associational marketing” evaluation. It will anchor this proposal in the historic development of the common law and courts’ construction of the Lanham Act, and then explore some of the rules, presumptions and defenses that might cabin this more limited cause of action.